Half a century has passed since Singapore attained independence. In a parliamentary debate in 1967, then-Foreign Minister S Rajaratnam noted that communalism, as it was playing out in newly-independent multi-racial Singapore’s political and social development, “must be and will always remain one of the major problems which, if we do not resolve intelligently, could break our society.”
From its earliest days, Singapore has been an ethnically-diverse society, transforming over the years into a global economic hub with an expanding cosmopolitan population. Singapore’s pioneers spoke of forging a Singaporean identity in spite of ethnic and religious differences.
Yet, developments in the last few decades have shown that issues of race and religion will not dissipate easily. The government’s constant reference to race and religion as “fault-lines” to be managed carefully will likely be a central feature of governance for many more years.
Religion as Cultural Ballast
Race, not religion, was a primary feature in the early period of the 1960s; although religious differences were acknowledged as part of Singapore’s post-independence social landscape. To a large extent, religion was subsumed under the racial categories. Adherents to the major religions – with the exception of Christianity – were often tied to ethnicity. In managing religious differences, the secular basis of the state was upheld through the republic’s Constitution. Noticeably, it was only in 1980 that “religion” was included as an item in the population census since independence. By then, religion had been highlighted as a potential tool in nation-building.
The Goh Keng Swee Report of 1978 positioned religion as a “cultural ballast” against the moral laxity that resulted from Singapore’s rapid modernisation. Religion was utilised to preserve conservative – or “Asian values” – as a foil to the “hippy and decadent culture of the West”. Despite fears from certain quarters on the potential erosion of the common space, political leaders then were insistent that the practice of religion would not trump the founding principles of secularism. In other words, Singapore sought to define its brand of secularism as not precluding religion from the public sphere, but to direct it towards what sociologist Robert Bellah termed as “civil religion”.
In 1984, Religious Knowledge was introduced as compulsory subject in national schools. Earlier, in responding to queries on the Moral Education Report of 1979 that recommended the teaching of religion in schools, then-Minister for Communications and Acting Minister for Culture Ong Teng Cheong explained that “the ethical rather than the religious in content and stresses universal values such as honesty and integrity” would constitute the Religious Knowledge curriculum.
Religious Revivalism
The global religious resurgence in the 1980s posed a unique challenge to Singapore, and led to an extensive study in 1987 on “Religion and Religious Revivalism”, commissioned by the then-Ministry of Community Development. Two concerns were highlighted: aggressive proselytisation and the politicisation of religion that could disrupt the “subtle and delicate equilibrium” of inter-religious relations. With increasing religiosity, religionists began encroaching upon those of other faiths in a bid to compete for souls for salvation. Also worrying was the rise in religious appeal that can be utilised to mobilise the masses, potentially de-legitimising the basis of political power and control as seen in other countries.
A new form of legislation was introduced to deal with both potential harms. The Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (MRHA) in 1990 gave the state the power to issue a restraining order against religious leaders or individuals who cause enmity, hatred, ill-will or hostility between religious groups; and promote political causes, conduct subversive acts or excite disaffection against the government under the guise of religion. The law was clear: religion and politics are two spheres to be kept apart, and for good reason: politicisation of religion had become a significant feature in modern identity politics.
For some, this represents a significant change in attitude compared to an earlier approach where religion was seen as a tool for social cohesion, not a potential division. Thus, religion was now seen as having to be “privatised” to minimise friction among people in the public sphere. The Religious Knowledge curriculum was then discontinued, while public involvement of religion in public sphere took an increasingly humanitarian approach – with religious institutions assisting the state in providing social-welfare needs of their respective communities within the “many helping hands” approach rolled out in 1991.
Perceived Retreat of the Moral State
The introduction of the MRHA may have kept overtly religious behaviour out of the public space. Yet, the same religious orientation that forms the basis for aggressive proselytisation continued to operate within the confines of the now privatised religious sphere. It would take a decade – when social media transformed the social landscape and blurred the public-private divide – for these tendencies to occupy public space and attention. The Youtube video of pastor Rony Tan who was seen disparaging Buddhist and Taoist believers, and the controversy over NUS student group Campus Crusade for Christ’s “insensitive” poster that made its rounds in Facebook, were two cases in point.
Correspondingly, it was also a perceived relaxation of the state’s influence on public morality that gave rise to the re-emergence of religious voices in public debates. The reinvention of Singapore into a vibrant cosmopolitan city-state in the 1990s resulted in a noticeable shift. There was greater range of diversity that called for public attention on how to negotiate them. This changing context includes public acknowledgement of homosexuals in the civil service, and the opening of casinos in two integrated resorts. The class of educated, well-travelled, well-connected Singaporeans with a different outlook grew, pushing the boundaries of conservative values that were once promulgated through state paternalism. The religious conservatives probably saw a need to re-enter the public sphere, with a focus on sexual and moral issues. This appeared to be the context for the takeover of the executive committee of women’s rights group AWARE by a group of women from the same church.
False Divides and New Convergences
With the backdrop of rising religious conservatism and the emergence of new voices pushing for religion to be kept out of public debates, the stage is set for “culture wars”. This can mean several things.
Firstly, apart from inter-religious “fault-lines”, new values are giving rise to a new friction. Contestations and divisions are not defined by membership within a particular religious community vis-à-vis the other, but along old and new values. An example is the global trend towards gender equality that is challenging some of the old and often, patriarchal values, upheld by traditional understanding of religions. In short, we may find greater convergence across religions along similar values, as we find greater divide within a religion based on the challenge of the new against the old.
Secondly, contestation of views within a religion itself has become apparent. The notion of a singular and monolithic representation of religious views may no longer hold. In last year’s controversy over the Wear White campaign to protest the Pink Dot event and the National Library Board’s decision to remove children’s books which refer to same-sex marriages, we are seeing more and more voices from within the religious communities who disagreed with the stance of certain religious conservatives at the forefront of the debate. These religious voices have argued for members of the gay community to be accorded equal rights as citizens of the state. At the same time, they have argued for the secular basis of the state to be upheld and for public policies to be as inclusive as possible to marginal and minority groups in a non-discriminatory manner. Religious views are not monolithic and this poses challenges for policymakers. Where religious authorities sanctioned by the state could previously be counted on to mobilise their believers for the nation-building cause, there is now a diffusion of religious authority. Religionists have carved out different turfs to reflect the multiplicity of beliefs and practices within each religion.
Thirdly, the secular-religious divide is a simplistic and false dichotomy. The argument that religion is private and the public is secular may not stand to scrutiny as religious considerations are and have been a part of policy-making. In Singapore, religion is an integral part of people’s lives and thus precluding them from public debates with policy implications may not be desirable nor possible. But allowing religious considerations is not akin to pushing for any singular religious view to dominate or determine public policy in a manner that excludes others with differing religious or non-religious values. Ultimately, public policy in a multi-religious setting (that includes non-religious communities too) must allow for rational engagement, in order to serve the public interest and good. No one particular view can or should dominate, and all views – religious or non-religious – can and should be subjected to scrutiny and challenge. Religious considerations can enrich public discourse but only if they do not infringe upon the rights of others to hold different and contrary views and values.
Confronting the Challenge
These changes will affect public policy in several ways.
First, the secular basis of the state will consistently be put to the test. Religion could shape sentiments in the electoral process. Religious lobbying will stretch the argument of state neutrality in enacting social policies.
Second, there is a need to configure new ways of understanding the diversity in religious sentiment, beyond what is communicated through traditional channels, such as religious authorities. Social policies may need to factor in a multiplicity of voices beyond the dominant, in order to be more inclusive. Policymakers will need to hone the ability to anticipate potentially-divisive issues. In light of this, citizenship education in schools should stress that majoritarianism – where the view of the simple majority holds – can no longer be the preferred approach to governance.
Third, we must expect greater debate, arguments and disagreements. In the past, this was frowned upon and issues pertaining to religion would be dubbed as out-of-bounds in the area of public discourse. But debating religious considerations and their role in national policy may not be a bad idea. It may even be desirable for a maturing process. The key is to distinguish civic and fair argument from that which incites hatred and violence. There are enough provisions in the legal handbook to deal with the latter. But it is also by flagging the latter that society learns to differentiate what is acceptable and unacceptable ways of putting a point across. More dialogue is certainly needed. But these discussions can no longer be an exchange of niceties. They have to be robust for Singapore society to stay diverse and thrive.
Mohamed Imran Mohamed Taib is an inter-faith activist and a founding member of Leftwrite Center, a dialogue initiative for young professionals. He thanks Dr Lai Ah Eng for her valuable inputs and comments. All views and mistakes remain the author’s.
Photo credit: ©iStock.com/imranahmedsg