At the Singapore 2020 General Elections (GE), the Workers’ Party (WP) secured a second group representation constituency (GRC) in Sengkang, repeating its 2011 feat when it seized Aljunied GRC. Furthermore, it recorded its first-ever majority vote share against the People’s Action Party (PAP) over its six contested constituencies this year.
A large part of the WP’s success has been due to its rooted geographical strategy. This entails the selection of a particular geographical area in Singapore as a party “headquarters” to concentrate party grassroots activities and campaign there. Other opposition parties could take a leaf from its playbook to see how they could make similar inroads in future elections.
Prioritising a geographical area should take precedence over current strategies of horse-trading and avoiding three-way fights. It can be argued that a particular party’s commitment to an area’s residents demonstrates its seriousness in serving the constituents, and the WP has demonstrated the durability of this strategy, winning a four-cornered fight at the Punggol East by-election. An increasingly involved Singaporean electorate is likely to value consistency and long-term commitment over more pragmatic approaches towards contesting.
In contrast to the WP, the newly-formed Progress Singapore Party (PSP) has contested constituencies ranging from West Coast GRC in the west to Marymount Single-Member Constituency (SMC) in central Singapore. Likewise, the National Solidarity Party (NSP) has yet to show signs of commitment to any particular geographical areas, having contested a variety of different constituencies, with the exception of Tampines GRC. The Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) has fared slightly better, having finally settled on constituencies in central and north-west Singapore after GE2011.
Parties such as the PSP and NSP must thus look at adopting a long-term electoral strategy, designating and reinforcing an area of Singapore to ensure better representation of an increasingly diverse Singaporean electorate. Such a strategy confers three main benefits.
1. Increased familiarity and commitment
The WP’s strategy of anchoring itself in the Singaporean north-east after 2001 has enabled citizens in the area to grow accustomed to and participate in its various grassroots activities over the years. The increased familiarity has had a reciprocal benefit – residents know their potential candidates ahead of the next election, while candidates gain a better understanding of the needs of the electorate.
Setting up party activities early also demonstrates a long-term commitment to the residents.
The PSP could build on its leader Tan Cheng Bock’s past experience as Member of Parliament (MP) for Ayer Rajah SMC to anchor itself in the west/south-west of Singapore.
One could argue that it was partly due to Tan’s deep roots in Ayer Rajah that the PSP’s team in West Coast GRC won 48.32% of the votes in GE2020. This made it the biggest opposition “loser” and, as a result, earned it the right to appoint two Non-Constituency MPs (NCMP) to Parliament.
Even though Jurong GRC and Radin Mas SMC were contested by Red Dot United and Reform Party respectively, PSP should have persisted to fight in these constituencies in place of those in the north.
In fact, the PSP was called out by PAP MP K. Shanmugam for its “half-heartedness” and readiness to trade its contest in Nee Soon with the Reform Party in exchange for other constituencies. While the parties involved have since denied any formal agreement, opposition parties can avoid future accusations altogether with a long-term grassroots approach to a particular area.
2. Insulation against electoral boundary redistribution
Concentrating party efforts in a select geographical area also readies opposition parties in the event of boundary redistributions. Contesting by geographical areas rather than delineated electoral boundaries ensures the certainty and continuity of party grassroots efforts. Such a strategy establishes that while campaign periods remain short, candidate recognition and voter trust suggest the need for a more durable electoral approach.
This was particularly evident at GE2011 and GE2020. Prior to 2011, Aljunied GRC had undergone several boundary redistributions, with the addition and subtraction of several SMCs in which the WP had previously contested. Sengkang GRC also comprised closely-fought past constituencies in Punggol East and Sengkang West SMCs.
However, the redrawing of boundary lines would seem to have had less of an impact over time. In GE2020, WP candidates were ready to contest Aljunied and Sengkang GRC, having interacted with the residents over the years. This strategy paid dividends as the WP became the first opposition party to successfully represent a newly formed GRC in 2020.
The WP also had a deep understanding of Sengkang’s demographics. Sengkang consists of a high proportion of young couples between the ages of 30-45 with young children. The WP team that won in Sengkang GRC boasted an average age of just 35, with Ms Raeesah Khan having since become the youngest MP at the age of 26. Had the WP fielded an older, less vibrant slate of candidates in Sengkang, it may not have received the majority vote in an otherwise close fight. Concentrating grassroots efforts in the north-eastern area of Singapore allowed the party to understand the constituency demographic and field the appropriate candidates regardless of electoral boundary redistributions.
3. Proper resource allocation and conservation
A geographical focus would also help smaller opposition parties with limited manpower and financing, allowing them to efficiently allocate and utilise their resources.
Campaigning in multiple parts of Singapore requires increased spending. Over the short campaign period, more resources are exhausted for campaign expenses in the form of publicity materials and travel costs. In the long run, setting up grassroots activities for two geographical areas while walking the ground in both dilutes available manpower and party visibility for future elections.
The WP made a conscious decision this year to reduce the number of constituencies it contested as compared to GE2015. This, as WP Secretary-General Pritam Singh stated, was so it could focus on a select few constituencies and field quality candidates.
Focusing party resources on one particular area may give the party a slight uptick in votes at the ballot boxes at the next election, which can be crucial in several closely contested constituencies such as West Coast, Bukit Batok and Bukit Panjang.
Conclusion
Given the geographical spread of Singaporean politics and the limited resources of the WP, there remain opportunities for opposition parties such as the PSP and the SDP to compete seriously in elections to come. Meanwhile, smaller opposition parties with limited resources will face difficult questions of potential mergers or dissolutions.
Nicholas Chua is a final year undergraduate at Singapore Management University where he majors in Politics, Law & Economics with a focus on public policy and governance. He was an intern at IPS from June to July 2020.