It is fashionable among academics and pundits to talk about America’s decline, which some speculate has brought the global order on the verge of falling apart.
“The global order that underpins international affairs today is by no means perfect,” said S R Nathan Fellow Professor Joseph Liow on November 1. “But it has brought about stability and economic development around the world.”
For at least the past three decades, Southeast Asia has benefitted greatly from this global order led by the United States.
With the global order potentially being at an inflection point, Prof Liow envisaged what this shift will look like and proposed what Southeast Asia and Singapore must do in response.
Prof Liow, who is also Dean of the College of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences at the Nanyang Technological University, is the Institute of Policy Studies’ (IPS) 13th S R Nathan Fellow.
His lecture was the second of three lectures as part of the IPS-Nathan Lecture Series on “Navigating Uncertainty: Our Region in an Age of Flux”.
On the verge of collapse?
“The reason the US is so dominant in global affairs today is basically because it won the Second World War,” Prof Liow said.
On the back of its accumulated military, economic and industrial power, the US went about building a global order that cemented with the collapse of the Soviet Union that had sought to provide an alternative order.
Global order, in essence, refers to the arrangement of power, rules and norms in an international system, said Prof Liow. This system serves to govern the behaviour of states and other international actors, and shape and structure patterns of activity, interaction and relationships between them, against the backdrop of globalisation.
A number of developments have since prompted questions of whether this global order is eroding.
The obvious example is the Russia-Ukraine war which showed Russia’s “blatant disregard for the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity”, Prof Liow said.
But, for others, the arguably single-most important structural catalyst of change is the rise of China as a financial and economic global power.
More importantly, China under President Xi Jinping is expanding its own influence through its size and growing economic and military strength, further chipping away at the US’ dominance.
“China is presenting alternatives to the developing world as it tries to send the message that America and the wider Western world should no longer enjoy the prerogative to set standards and write the rules of everything from global trade and finance to who gets to define, much less impose, democracy,” Prof Liow said.
Another factor prompting questions of the global order’s erosion is America’s changing role and the perception that the country is in decline.
While data on the US’ military expenditure and the dollar’s share of global currency reserves does not show that the US has entered a state of terminal decline, Prof Liow acknowledged the perception that American interest in the world has declined and the world’s unease with American dominance in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and Donald Trump’s presidency.
Where is the global order headed?
Prof Liow outlined four ways the global order will change. First, the new order will be more multipolar but asymmetrical, as regional powers become increasingly vocal and active in their respective regions.
With American influence and resources stretched as their leaders deal with domestic calls to prioritise the economy, others have emerged to seek larger roles.
“The US will still be a consequential player – in some areas probably the most consequential for the foreseeable future – but it can no longer be assumed that it is both able and willing to command overwhelming dominance,” he said.
Second, some principles such as sovereignty and international law will still command great support, but others such as liberal democracy, free markets and human rights will be increasingly subject to contention.
Third, certain aspects of globalisation will change as talk of de-globalisation in the name of “de-risking” and “onshoring” gain popularity alongside a pushback from the middle class in the Global North that feel they have been weakened by the liberal economic system.
Fourth, regional architectures and institutions, and minilaterals, will assume greater importance as diverging preferences and priorities emerge among states in larger institutions such as the United Nations.
Southeast Asia’s agency in a changing global order
Amid a changing global order, Southeast Asia will find its own regional order challenged in a few ways, said Prof Liow.
First, continued American disinterest in global trade will invariably affect Southeast Asia, a region that is deeply plugged into international trading networks.
Second, intensifying rivalry among great powers has led to efforts by China to create new institutions to challenge American leadership and dominance of prevailing ones. “Needless to say, this has potential impact on ASEAN, putatively the premier institution for Southeast Asia,” Prof Liow said.
Third, ASEAN must consider how it exercises agency in terms of shaping the rules, particularly for those affecting its own region.
He raised the example of the Kampuchean conflict about 40 years ago, when the then five-member ASEAN assumed a proactive role the interests of external powers appeared to threaten to overwhelm ASEAN’s.
Today, the evolution of the Indo-Pacific as a strategic concept illustrates a similar dilemma, with all key actors besides China having articulated an Indo-Pacific strategy, tilt, or vision, Prof Liow said.
As much as the notion of ASEAN centrality divides opinion, observers have often pointed to the organisation’s convening power to explain what the concept means.
“But the question ASEAN should ask is whether it is satisfied for convening power to be an end in itself; or whether it should be a means to a larger end, that being the pursuit of Southeast Asia’s collective strategic objectives and interests,” Prof Liow said.
He added that while it is good that major powers profess support for ASEAN centrality, it is important to be mindful why they are allowing this collection of states to claim centrality.
Prof Liow suggested two reasons: ASEAN serves a purpose to them and there is no cost to them acknowledging its centrality.
“Therein lies the tension between possibilities and constraints for ASEAN insofar as centrality is concerned,” he said. While the hope is that ASEAN can sharpen its strategic proficiency, it needs to be realistic of its constraints, particularly now with 10 members.
As for Singapore, the country has to continue reinforcing the importance of international law in its foreign policy.
The country should also place emphasis on international institutions and inclusive multilateralism, foremost of which should be ASEAN, he added.
Singapore must also stress the importance of an open global economy and trading system, because international trade has been its lifeline even before independence.
“The shifting sands of global order we are witnessing today are perhaps not so much a matter of erosion or destruction, giving rise to monsters as it were, but rather the onset of a new stage in its evolution,” he said.
“Together with our ASEAN neighbours, Singapore must now adjust to these new configurations and realities. Even better if we can work together to get ahead of them.”
Question and Answer
During the Question-and-Answer segment, Prof Liow elaborated that with more members having joined ASEAN, it has become more difficult for member states to come to an understanding of each other’s interest and shared challenges.
This is why he cautioned against expecting ASEAN member states to transcend their own interests for the sake of a united ASEAN identity.
He was responding to the moderator, Professor Barry Desker, a distinguished fellow at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) and Nanyang professor of practice at the Nanyang Technological University, who brought up how ASEAN states are taking divergent positions on recent geopolitical issues such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas war.
Prof Liow added: “Ironically, the better sense of the limitations we have the better of a chance of actually getting things done.”
In response to a later question about whether the Israel-Hamas war will complicate geopolitical challenges in the region, Prof Liow said that extremist groups in Southeast Asia wanting to agitate support for the plight of the Palestinians will create not just security challenges but difficulties in the relationship between communities.
“The United States has never been an unequivocally welcomed power in our region in the first place,” he added, noting what has happened in Afghanistan and Iraq in the aftermath of 9/11.
Furthermore, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s unapologetic support for the Palestinian cause — while understandable — will present issues when Malaysia wants to openly work with the US, he said.
“But the challenge for our neighbours today is that the domestic political configuration today is far more brittle than it was 20 years ago.”
Click here to watch the video of lecture II.